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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
***************************************** 
JAN H. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
JUDITH ANN PETERSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
No- 17289 
***************************************** 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action commenced by the Defendant-Respondent 
against the Plaintiff-Appellant in a proceeding to reinstate ali-
mony in the divorce decree following an annulment. Both the ori-
ginal divorce decree and the annulment involved the same parties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court Judge, G. HAL TAYLOR, after hearing 
the evidence concluded that the alimony under the divorce decree 
should be reinstated and that the life insurance policy should be 
maintained naming the Defendant-Respondent as beneficiary. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks an Order from this Court 
upholding the trial court's Order reinstating alimony under her 
prior divorce decree. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties to this action originally married in 1967 
and remained married ,for eleven years* In June, 1978, the Plain-
tiff-Appellant, JAN H. PETERSON, filed an action for divorce 
against the Defendant-Respondent, JUDITH ANN PETERSON, (R 2-4). 
The case was finally settled by Stipulation between the parties 
and the Plaintiff-Appellant agreed to pay to the Defendant-Re-
spondent the sum of $250 per month as alimony (R 5-16). At the 
time of the divorce, the Plaintiff-Appellant's income was $1,000 
per month net (R 77) and at the time of the reinstatement hearing 
his net earnings were $1,024.94 (R 88). The Plaintiff-Appel-
lant's expenses had decreased as a result of his payoff of num-
erous of the financial obligations which existed at the time of 
the divorce (R 128). The Defendant-Respondent had no income at 
the time of the divorce. At the time of the hearing for rein-
statement of alimony she was on public assistance, receiving $253 
per month (R 95, 105). Defendant-Respondent further indicated 
that her expenses had substantially increased between the time of 
the divorce and the time of the reinstatement hearing (R 93). 
On May 20, 1979, the parties remarried and lived to-
gether as husband and wife for two weeks (R 85). On July 16, 
1979, the Defendant-Respondent herein filed a complaint for an-
nulment in Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. D79-2818. 
The annulment proceeding went forward on a Stipulation, Waiver, 
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and Consent signed by Plaintiff-Appellant and was entered on 
August 21, 1979. No appeal was ever filed from said decree. The 
trial court took judicial notice of and was familiar with the an-
nulment action (R 75-76). 
Subsequently, the Defendant-Respondent herein filed a 
motion in the Third Judicial District Court for reinstatement of 
the alimony under the divprce decree. The matter was heard be-
fore the Honorable Judge, G. HAL TAYLOR, of the Third Judicial 
District Court who after hearing the evidence ruled in favor of 
Defendant-Respondent and reinstated the alimony. From this de-
cision, the Plaintiff-Appellant has filed this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT IS GIVEN CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION IN 
DECIDING FAMILY MATTERS, AND NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS SHOWN BY 
APPELLANT. 
This case comes to the Supreme Court on review of a 
discretionary ruling. In accordance with the holding of the 
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 546 P.2d 1380 (1977), this Court has 
granted the trial court responsibility to exercise its sound 
discretion in ordering reinstatement of alimony upon consid-
eration of all of the circumstances presented at the trial. In 
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conformance with that decision, the Defendant-Respondent herein 
filed a Motion for Reinstatement of Alimony under the prior de- m 
cree and the Court having heard all of the evidence presented by 
the parties, concluded that reinstatement of alimony under the 
circumstances was equitable, | 
This Court in Maple v. Mapley 566 P.2d 1229 (1977) f in 
reviewing an appeal from an annulment stated its general rule of 
review: ( 
wIn reviewing the findings and order made pursuant to an 
annulment under the authorization of statute quoted 
above (UCA, Section 30-1-17.2), the rule of review by 
this Court is the same as in other family problems. Due 
to the trial court's advantaged position and responsibi- \ < 
lities, we indulge him considerable latitude of discre-
tion and do not disagree therewith and upset his judg-
ment unless it appears that there has been a plain abuse 
thereof." (Id. at p. 1230) 
The sole issue raised by Plaintiff-Appellant's relies 
on an assumption that the trial court misinterrupted the Findings 
and Conclusions of Judge Winder in the annulment proceedings be-
tween the parties. This assumption is not supported by the re-
cord. The trial judge stated he had read the annulment file and 
he was familiar with it (R 75-76). Defendant-Respondent asserts 
that the Findings and Conclusions of the annulment so far as the 
grounds were concerned were inmaterial to the issues presented by 
this appeal and the Court's Findings of Fact issued in support of 
its decision herein were clearly supported by the evidence pre-
sented by the parties at the hearing herein. The Plaintiff-
Appellant has clearly failed in its burden to demonstrate any 
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plain abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
POINT II, 
THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ALIMONY IN 
THE ANNULMENT PROCEEDING AND THE REINSTATEMENT OF ALIMONY WAS 
CLEARLY EQUITABLE. 
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-117.2 
provide certain criteria under which a Court in an annulment 
proceeding may grant maintenance or alimony to the parties. 
Those conditions are as follows: 
1. The parties have accummulated any property or ac-
quired any obligations. 
2. There is a geniune need arising from economic 
change of circumstances due to the marriage. 
3. There are children born or expected. 
During the second marriage of the parties, they lived together 
only two weeks (R 85). The trial court herein specifically found 
that none of the above criteria were met in this case and that 
the Defendant-Respondent was not entitled to alimony under the 
narrow scope of the annulment statute (R 57-58). Therefore, her 
sole remedy was to petition the Court for reinstatement of the 
alimony as provided by this Court in the Ferguson decision 
(5) 
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(Supra). 
In Ferguson (Supra) this Court reviewed this issue in 
light of two prior cases of Kent v. Kent, 28 U.2d 334, 497 P.2d 
652 (1972) and Cecil v. Cecil, 11 U.2d 155, 356 P.2d 279 (I960), 
In Ferguson, the Court substantially altered the direction of the 
prior two named cases which seemed to hold that upon the annul-
ment of the subsequent marriage, the prior alimony decree was 
automatically reinstated. The Court in Ferguson opted for a more 
liberal rule which would not be regarded as absolute but which 
rather required the parties to obtain Court review of the circum-
stances in an equitable determination as to whether the alimony 
should be reinstated. The Court in Ferguson held: 
"Upon proper application of the District Court invoking 
its continuing jurisdiction, it should be free to pro-
ceed in conformity with its general equitable powers 
upon these generally sound proposition; that when a wife 
remarries, her right to receive alimony under the di-
vorce decree from her former husband should terminate, 
and that an annulment of subsequent marriage should not 
automatically restore the alimony under the prior de-
cree. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court may 
exercise its sound discretion in ordering the reinstate-
ment of the alimony in the prior decree if, upon its 
consideration of all the circumstances, it appears 
clearly and persuasively that that is necessary to rec-
tify serious inequity or injustice." (Id. at p. 1383) 
In this case, the Court heard evidence relative to the 
equitable considerations involved in this particular situation. 
The Court specifically found that since the original divorce de-
cree the wife's (Defendantfs-Respondentfs) health had deterior-
ated, that she had a physical condition which was a serious lim-
itation on her ability to work; that the husband's (Plaintiff!s-
(6) 
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Appellant's) income was substantially the same; that the attemp-
ted marriage of the parties did not adversely alter nor change 
the Plaintiffs-Appellant's circumstances so that it would be 
inequitable to require him to continue his alimony payments. 
It is further obvious from the facts that none of the 
fears delineated in the Ferguson case apply here. The Plaintiff-
Appellant participated in the marriage and no circumstances were 
left dangling which were uncertain to him. He had constant in-
fluence and control over this marriage. His wife was not in a 
position as a result of the remarriage to collude with her later 
spouse for the purpose of restoring alimony by entering into an 
annulment proceeding since the new marriage herein was between 
the same parties. 
Furthermore, the evidence introduced at the trial here-
in indicated that the husband (Plaintiff-Appellant) had very 
nearly engaged in the hyp.othetical situation discussed in Fergu-
son as follows: 
"Assume, for example, a situation where a wife of many 
years had reared a family, was divorced under ever so 
just and proper decree awarding her alimony; and because 
of disability, age, or for any reason was unable to make 
a livelihood. Assume further that a husband, motivated 
by animosity or avarice that sometimes exist, procures 
an accomplice to connive in a nefarious scheme for the 
accomplice to persuade the wife to marry him, with a 
preconceived design of getting the marriage annulled. 
This for the purpose of effecting the automatic term-
inate of the husband's obligation to pay alimony. As-
sume that this plan is carried out. Should the wife be 
left an object of charity or public welfare? The possi-
bility of unconscionable imposition and of injustice is 
obvious." (Id at p.1382) 
(7) -A 
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In this case, the Plaintiff-Appellant rather than pro-
curing an accomplice to marry his former wife in a scheme to ter-
minate the alimony; persuaded her by duress, threats, and physi-
cal violence to remarry him. The subsequent annulment was heard 
by Judge Winder and he was convinced upon facts presented at the 
annulment hearing that, in fact, the marriage was induced by 
fraud and an annulment decree was entered and never appealled 
from. This is res judicata on the issue of fradulent inducement 
of the Plaintiff-Appellant (husband) inducing the Defendant-Re-
spondent (wife) to marry him the second time. As soon as this 
scheme became apparent to Defendant-Respondent, she immediately 
filed for and received the annulment. Indeed, if the Plaintiff-
Appellant is allowed to benefit as a result of this fraud and 
coercion, others will be encouraged to employ the same or similar 
schemes. 
In summary, the equities as demonstrated by the facts 
presented to the trial court clearly favor a reinstatement of the 
alimony and public policy would seem best served by discouraging 
fraudulently induced marriages for the sole purpose of termina-
ting alimony under a prior decree. Furthermore, public policy 
would also seem better served by encouraging parties to attempt 
reconcilliation of prior marriages by retaining for each party 
the opportunity to maintain the status quo in the event the 
subsequent marriage fails. If Plaintiff-Appellant! s position is 
adopted as the rule of law in this state, then indeed, subsequent 
(8) 
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marriages between spouses impose a substantial risk on the wife 
who stands to lose her prior alimony award if the subsequent re-
marriage fails. 
Plaintiff-Appellant erroneously confuses the issue of 
res judicata with the availability of the Defendant-Respondent to 
obtain alimony in her annulment proceeding. Plaintiff-Appellant 
asserted at trial that Defendant-Respondent's failure to ask for 
alimony in her annulment proceeding, constituted res judicata and 
she was barred from seeking reinstatement of alimony under her 
prior divorce. In making this argument, Plaintiff-Appellant 
fails to recognize that the availability of obtaining alimony in 
annulment proceedings is narrow (i.e. only under specified cri-
teria) and the trial court in this case, specifically, held that 
none of the criteria set forth in Utah Code Annotated, Section 
30-1-17.2 were met (R 57-58). Therefore, the alimony was not 
available to Defendant-Respondent in said proceeding. Plaintiff-
Appellant erroneously concludes that the unavailability of ali-
mony in the annulment proceeding is a complete bar to alimony re-
instatement under Ferguson decision. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiff-Appellant erroneously as-
serts that the decision of the trial court should be overturned 
because of failure to hear evidence as to the circumstances sur-
rounding the remarriage and annulment. This position is taken in 
light of the fact that Plaintiff-Appellant made no proffer of 
proof on that issue. At the trial, Plaintiff-Appellant only at-
(9) 
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tempted to introduce evidence of Defendant1s-Respondent's "atti-
tude", "veracity", "animosity", and "vindictiveness" (Rill). The 
court, over objection by Defendant-Respondent, heard the evidence 
offered and then concluded that it had no probative value to the 
issue before the court (R113). No further evidence of circum-
stances surrounding the marriage and annulment was offered by 
Plaintiff-Appellant. Ironically, the Plaintiff-Appellant object-
ed to Defendant1s-Respondent1s attempt to introduce such evidence 
and the Court' sustained Plaintiff's-Appellantfs objection 
(R83-84). Plaintiff-Appellant is now taking the position that 
the Court erred by sustaining his own objection! 
CONCLUSION 
In this matter, the trial court sitting in equity heard 
evidence offered by both parties concerning facts and circum-
stances justifying the reinstatement of alimony by the Plaintiff-
Appellant. The Court concluded that the annulment did not in-
equitably alter the original situation between the parties as 
both, parties participated in the affair. The Court concluded 
that the Plaintiff-Appellant was as capable of paying alimony at 
the time of the hearing as he was prior to the remarriage and at 
the time of the divorce. The needs of the Defendant-Respondent 
for alimony were increased due to her limited working capacity. 
The conclusions reached by the Court are clearly supported by the 
facts presented at the hearing; are clearly consistent with the 
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Ferguson holding and do not involve an abuse of discretion; 
hencef the decision of the lower Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this /$j£. day of March, 1981. 
RAJ 
4^55 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were mailed to CRAIG S. COOK, 3645 East 3100 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 and to JAY E. MESERVY, 820 
Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorneys for 
day of March, 1981. 
{ /> 
Plaintiff-Appellant, on this /^^L? 
LINDA A. TABOR, Secretary 
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